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GOD AND GUNS: THE FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION PROBLEMS OF REGULATING
GUNS IN CHURCHES AND OTHER
HOUSES OF WORSHIP
JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA*

This Article demonstrates that the cases raising religious liberty
challenges to state regulation of weapons in houses of worship reveal the
persistent problems plaguing religious liberty cases. First, these cases
illustrate the difficulties non-mainstream religious claims face. Courts
may not understand the religious nature of the claim or they may devalue
claims that do not seem "normal" or "reasonable." This is compounded
by how few religious liberty claimants, especially non-mainstream
religions, win their cases. Second, the cases are part of the larger debate
about how easy it should be to get judicially imposed religious exemptions
from general and neutral laws. Uncritically granting exemptions could
undermine the statutory scheme and the rule of law. Too stingy an
approach and religious freedom becomes an empty promise. Third, the
cases show the problems with a neutral approach. Neutrality is often held
out as the appropriatetouchstone for religious liberty analysis. Findinga
neutralstandpoint,however, is difficult, if not impossible, especially when
dealing with religion. This difficulty forces courts to find "neutrality" by
silently relying on their background assumptions about religion, which
only exacerbatesthe problems of non-mainstream claimants. These three
difficulties have relevance to the current litigation concerning the Patient
Protectionand Affordable CareAct.
This Article concludes that these persistent problems flow from the
ambiguity about religious liberty's purpose. Adopting one or another
perspective dictates the paths that courts take in religiousliberty cases.
* Dean Emeritus and Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. A summer research grant
supported the work on this Article. Thanks to Leslie Copeland and Joyce Olajumoke Ajayi
who provided expert research assistance and advice when I needed it the most and to Terri
Beiner, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, who gently but persistently encouraged me
to return to my scholarship after years of mind numbing work as a law school administrator.
Thanks also to my colleagues who attended a faculty development lunch where they heard a
much rougher version of this piece.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2013, the Arkansas General Assembly allowed people to take
guns into places of worship.' Representatives of religious congregations
offered differing testimony on the need for the bill.' Some legislators
were concerned that a categorical prohibition violated religious liberty.3
1. Act of Feb. 11, 2013, Act 67, § 1, 2013 Ark. Acts 273, 274 (codified as amended at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-306(16) (Supp. 2013)). Prior law categorically exempted churches.
Id. § 5-73-306(17) (1997). The new statute continues this categorical exemption but "does not
preclude a church or other place of worship from determining who may carry a concealed
handgun into the church or other place of worship." Id. § 5-73-306(16)(B) (Supp. 2013). This
issue came up in the 2011 legislative session during which I was asked for my opinion on the
free exercise implications of the former categorical exemption for churches. See Lee Hogan,
Beebe Signs Guns in Church Bill into Law, ARK. ONLINE (Feb. 11, 2013, 1:26 PM), http://ww
w.arkansasonline.com/news/2013/feb/11/gov-beebe-signs-guns-church-bill-law/, archived at htt
p://perma.cc/B2MW-7BH4.
2. See Sean Beherec, Michael R. Wickline & Sarah D. Wire, Church Leaders Give
Views on Guns in Sanctuaries,ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 2013, at 8A.
3. See Letter from Dustin McDaniel, Attorney Gen., to Beverly Pyle, Ark. State
Legislature Representative (Sept. 29, 2009). Representative Pyle, the requestor, also asked
for my opinion. See letter on file with author. The legislation included an "Emergency
Clause" declaring that
personal security is increasingly important; that the Second Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States ensures a person's right to bear arms; and that this
act is immediately necessary because a person should be allowed to carry a firearm
in a church that permits the carrying of a firearm for personal security.
Act 67, § 2, 2013 Ark. Acts at 274. So-called "emergency clauses" are routinely added to
legislation to allow laws to go into effect immediately. Opponents of the change offered
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This argument was similar to the one made by Georgia churches that
sued the state over its categorical prohibition on guns in churches.' On
the other hand, Minnesota churches sued the state when that state
changed the law to allow guns in houses of worship.5
This correlation of guns and religion raises a number of interesting,
non-trivial questions about the application of First Amendment law and
the nature of religious liberty. This Article will explore some of those
questions.6
II. BASIC GUN CONTROL MEASURES AND HOUSES OF WORSHIP

Gun control measures revolve around two basic issues: who should
be allowed to carry a gun and where those guns should be allowed to be
carried.7 The first focuses on how easy it should be to carry guns and
who should be allowed to carry them. 8 The second focuses on where
those guns should be allowed.'
explicitly religious arguments for continuing the ban during a previous attempt to amend the
bill. See Charlie Frago & Michael R. Wickline, House Passes Gun-in-Church Bill, ARK.
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Feb. 12,2009, at A10.
4. See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S.Ct. 856 (2013).
5. See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008).
6. The Second Amendment implications of categorical gun bans in sensitive places are
beyond the scope of this Article. There is an extensive and growing body of scholarship on
Second Amendment issues. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 1443 (2009).
7. This follows Heller's reminder that Second Amendment rights are not absolute and
its brief list of permissible categories of regulations. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 626-27 (2008) ("[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings .. ");
see also Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry FirearmsOutside of the Home: SeparatingHistorical
Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1719 n.132 (2012) (citing
nineteenth-century statutes banning guns in sensitive places).
8. Some states allow gun holders to carry their guns openly.
Open Carry,
OPENCARRY.ORG, http://www.opencarry.org/?page-id=103 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/PX9P-FFG8 (labeling Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming as "Gold Star" open carry states, and labeling Florida,
Illinois, New York, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington D.C. as "Non Permissive" opencarry states). Other states require gun owners to conceal their guns when in public. Id.; see
also Ginny Fahs, Illinois Is 50th State to Legalize CarryingConcealed Weapons, NPR (July 10,
2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.npr.orglblogs/the-two-way/2013/07/10/200789406/llinois-is-50th-st
ate-to-legalize-carrying-concealed-weapons,
archived at
http://perma.cc/V6NJ-8ZKS
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One rationale is that although carrying weapons in public may be
helpful for individual self-defense, that justification breaks down in large
public gatherings.' ° Most people will be unarmed and crowded into a
confined space. Even one person with a gun may cause considerable
injury before being stopped. Moreover, an exchange of gunfire between
the "good guys" and the "bad guys" may be just as dangerous as a lone
gunman.11 Another rationale is that some places are incompatible with
weapons. Schools, courthouses, government buildings, and legislative
chambers are places where either vulnerable populations are housed
(like schools) or where public business is conducted. The use or threat
of force is incompatible with this property's function. Finally, some
"sensitive places" provide security by screening people who enter, thus
obviating the need for an individual to be armed for self-defense. 2
Houses of worship share some but not all of the characteristics of each
of these categories.13
(reporting that all fifty states now have provisions for concealed carrying of weapons). Some
states require officials to issue permits if applicants meet certain threshold requirements. See
Steven W. Kranz, Comment, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes: Can Small
Changes Help Reduce the Controversy?, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 637, 670-708 (2006) (listing 35
states in the Appendix as "shall-issue" states). Embedded into these processes is the question
of who, if anyone, should not be allowed to carry a gun. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012)
(prohibiting the sale or disposition of firearms to felons, fugitives, illegal aliens, and domestic
violence offenders, among others); id. § 922(x)(2) (prohibiting juveniles from possessing a
handgun or handgun ammunition).
9. Volokh, supra note 6, at 1515 ("Many laws prohibit most people from possessing
guns in certain places, such as on all public streets, in bars, in parks, and in public housing
projects.").
10. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated on other
grounds, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding ban on possession of firearms in "open air"
places "because possessing firearms in such places risks harm to great numbers of defenseless
people (e.g., children)").
11. See Nordyke, 563 F.3d at 459 (ruling against open carry and, for that matter, carry
laws). The Supreme Court recently declined to hear three cases challenging gun laws, giving
rise to the inference that states may proscribe gun possession in certain places. Lawrence
Hurley, Supreme Court Declines Challenges to Gun Laws, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2014, 10:00
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-usa-court-guns-idUSBREA1Nl28214022
4, archived at http://perma.cc/KD3A-9TJM.
12. Brian C. Whitman, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller's Second Amendment in
Sensitive Places,81 MISS. L.J. 1987, 1989-90 (2012).
13. Id. at 2007-08 (calling gun bans in houses of worship an "obvious violation" of the
Second Amendment). Colleges and universities are often included in these lists, too. Id. at
2006-07. The constitutionality of gun bans on campus is fiercely contested. Compare Joan H.
Miller, Comment, The Second Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235
(2011) (arguing that broad gun bans are constitutional), with Brian Miller, Legal Experts:
Campus Gun Bans Flawed, Unconstitutional,COLLEGE FIX (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.thecol
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Other states permit holders to carry guns anywhere but allow

property owners to ban weapons on their property by posting notices or
using other methods to notify permit holders. 4 In opt-out jurisdictions,

permit holders can carry guns into houses of worship unless the
organization posts notices declaring its property a gun-free zone. 5
Churches and other houses of worship have argued that requiring them
to post opt-out notices violated their religious beliefs in peace and in
offering worshipers a safe and inclusive sanctuary. 6 In the categorical
jurisdictions, churches have argued that the total ban violates their
religious freedom. 7 They believe that it is "right and just" for their
members to attend services armed and the state cannot interfere with
this belief and action.18
These claims raise questions about the nature of religious freedom in
today's world as well as the adequacy of current First Amendment law."
One might be suspicious of claims that "God requires us to bring our
weapons to church," but claiming a divine command to be armed is not
unprecedented.2 ° Sikhs have long made this exact claim.2 1 Modern-day
legefix.com/post/12393/, archived at http://perma.cc/8UV6-8ZXT (reporting that some
professors suggest that "[s]ome campus firearms regulations" may violate student and
employee rights under the Constitution). See generally David B. Kopel, Pretend "Gun-Free"
School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 515 (2009); Brian J. Siebel, The
Case Against Guns on Campus, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 319 (2008); Lewis M.
Wasserman, Gun Control on College and University Campuses in the Wake of District of
Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 55 (2011)
(stating that "thoughtfully adopt[edl" gun bans based on scientific research are consistent
with Heller, and McDonald restrictions are probably constitutional).
14.

ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-73-306(19)(A)(i) (1997 & Supp. 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 237.110(17) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(a) (West
2009 & Supp. 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13) (2011 & Supp. 2012); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 571.107(1)(15) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-12(C) (LexisNexis
2013); id. § 30-14-6(A)-(B) (LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.11(c)(8) (2011);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.12.6(C)(3) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2014); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1290.22(C) (West Supp. 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-220(2) (2007); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-1359(a)-(b) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.06(b) (West 2011). 1
will refer to these states, collectively, as "opt-out jurisdictions."
15. See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. Minnesota, 745 N.W.2d 194, 202 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2008).
16. Id. at 199-202.
17. See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012).
18. See id. at 1249 n.8.
19. See Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: Tie
History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222 (2003) [hereinafter Feldman,
Religious Minorities].
20. See David B. Kopel, Evolving ChristianAttitudes Towards Personaland National
Self-Defense, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1709 (2013) [hereinafter Kopel, Evolving Attitudes]; David B.
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Christians, on the other hand, must infer such a duty.22 The result could
be a corruption of religion with the latest political cause.23 At the same
time, this very suspicion should make us wary. It is an enduring
problem of free exercise law that we will tolerate the religious claims
that seem most reasonable because they seem "normal."2 4
Current First Amendment law cannot coherently address these
different situations. In the categorical jurisdictions, the claims will
founder on whether or not the law actually burdens a religious belief
because the religious claim collapses into the secular preference to be
armed. Yet the categorical exclusion of places of worship singles them
out for exceptional treatment and includes them with other areas that
may have little in common with places of worship. 6 In the opt-out
jurisdictions, the claim will founder because, although it may be easier
for a court to see a religious burden, the laws will be neutral and
generally applicable.27 They do not single out religion. Rather, they
allow churches to opt out by following exactly the same procedures as
any other property owner.2' Yet this seems to demean the religious
nature of the claim-providing sanctuary-and reduces it, once again,
to a matter of personal preference.
In both instances, the religious nature of the claim confounds the
analysis. Courts devalue the religious nature of the claim when they
privilege mainstream or "normal" religious claims.29 At the same time,
religious adherents must tame or sanitize their claim for it to be

Kopel, The Religious Roots of the American Revolution and the Right to Keep and BearArms,
17 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL'Y 167 (2005) [hereinafter Kopel, Religious Roots].
21. See Michael Baker, Security and the Sacred: Examining Canada's Legal Response to
the Clash of Public Safety and Religious Freedom, 13 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2010).
22. See Kopel, -Otudes, supra note 20.
23. See id.
24. See infra Part VII.A.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 74-81; see also Blake Farmer, Kentucky Southern
Baptists Draw Crowds With Gun Giveaways, NPR (Mar. 10, 2014, 3:02 AM), http://www.npr.o
rg/2014/03/1/287311237/Kentucky-southern-baptists-draw-crowds-with-gun-giveaways?utmmedium=Email&utm-source=share&utmcampaign=storysbare, archivedat http://perma.cc/6
KAV-28PZ.
26. Examples include legislative buildings or public parks. See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.org,
Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012)
27. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (stating that laws must be neutral and
generally applicable).
28. See supra note 14.
29. See infra Part VII.A.

2015]

GOD AND GUNS

1109

understood and accepted by courts.3" This has relevance for other free
exercise claims. Indeed, it is one of the most problematic aspects of free
exercise law.3 If courts too easily grant religious exemptions, the rule of

law is undermined.32 On the other hand, unless courts remain open to
"unusual" religious claims, free exercise law is a tautology: the only
religious practices we protect are the ones we already practice.
III. THE TWO CASES RAISING ISSUES OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND GUNS

In 2005, the Minnesota legislature passed the Minnesota Citizens'
Personal Protection Act.33 The act made Minnesota a "shall issue" state
with regard to permits to carry a handgun and changed Minnesota law
with regard to the right to carry and possess a gun on private property
within the state.' The Minnesota act allowed private establishments to
prohibit the possession of guns on their property by posting notices with
statutorily mandated language. At the same time, it prohibited private
establishments from banning guns in their parking lots and-prevented
these establishments from barring their tenants' possession of guns on
their rented property.36 Places of worship fell within the definition of
private establishment and, like other private establishments, had to post
"no gun" notices to prevent possession inside the church or in their
rented space.37

30. See infra notes 196-209 and accompanying text.
31. See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 19, at 251-59.
32. See Smith, 494 U.S at 879; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,166-67 (1878).
33. Act of May 24, 2005, ch. 83, § 1, 2005 Minn. Laws 441, 442 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015)).
34. The law had been enacted first in 2003. Act of April 28, 2003, ch. 28, art. 2-3, 2003
Minn. Laws 265, 272-98. It was immediately challenged by religious, charitable, and
municipal organizations who argued that the law violated the Minnesota constitution's
protection for religious liberty as well as the constitutional requirement that each law contain
only one subject. See Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585, 590 & n.2, 600
(Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the trial court, which struck down the law on that latter
ground but did not consider the religious claims). The legislature then reenacted the law and
made it retroactive to the date of its initial adoption. Act of May 24, 2005, ch. 83, § 1, 2005
Minn. Laws 441, 442 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West 2009 &
Supp. 2015)).
35. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(a)-(b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015).
36. Id. § 624.714(17)(c), (e).
37. Id. § 624.714(17)(a)-(c); Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194,
200-02 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
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Two churches challenged the law claiming that it violated the
Minnesota constitution's "Freedom of Conscience" provision,38 the
Federal First Amendment Right of Free Association,3 9 and the federal
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).4 °
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on all counts. 4' The court
found that the signage requirement burdened the religious beliefs and

practices of the churches by requiring them to parrot a state-mandated
message. 42 The trial court also found that the "parking lot" provision
substantially burdened religion.43 The state argued that church parking
lots should not be given any special religious protection unless they were
used as part of a religious celebration." The court found, however, that

parking lots "are integral to [the church's] religious mission."45 It would
make little sense to allow churches to ban guns in the sanctuary but to

38. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("Freedom of conscience; no preference to be given to any
religious establishment or mode of worship. The enumeration of rights in this constitution
shall not deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people. The right of every
man to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed;
nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of
or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law
to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from the
treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.").
39. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000) (holding that the
First Amendment includes the right to not associate with others if doing so changes the
message of the organization); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1958) (stating that the First Amendment to United States Constitution protects right of
individuals to associate with one another).
40. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012)).
41. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 5-21 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Nov. 14, 2006), 2006 WL 6111893, affd in part and rev'd in part, 745 N.W.2d 194
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
42. Id. at 9-10; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 204-05. The churches' pastors' affidavits
were sufficient for the court to find a substantial burden on religion. See Edina,
No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 9-10; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 199-200. The state
attempted to rebut the harm by arguing that the churches could add additional messages to
the signs so long as they still communicated that guns were forbidden. See Edina,No. 27-CV05-11659, slip op. at 10; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 205.
43. Edina, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 10-12; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 206-07.
44. See Edina, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 11; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 207.
45. Edina, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 11.
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be forced to tolerate them in their parking lots.46 The court also found
that the landlord-tenant provision burdened the churches' religious
beliefs because the church's private tenants were there only because
they furthered the churches' religious missions.47
The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the judgment that the law

was a violation of the Minnesota constitution's protection of religious
freedom.48 Unlike the lower standard used under the United States
Constitution,49 the state used a compelling interest test to determine the

law's constitutionality under the state constitution. 0 The court found
that the law substantially burdened the religious beliefs and practices of
the churches."' First, the law burdened religion by forcing the churches

"to act in a manner that is inconsistent with their religious beliefs by
requiring that they place specific, conspicuous signs at every entrance to

the church.""

The law required private establishments not only to post

a sign but also to request that anyone who fails to comply leave the

premises.53 Only at that point could the entrant be prosecuted for
trespassing.

Both churches were traditional "peace" churches that

sought to welcome everyone to their sanctuary and to use church
property to further their religious missions.54

entrances have a special meaning to Lutherans.

Moreover, church

Requiring the church

46. The appellate court also noted that there was ample parking available on public
property. Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 209.
47. Edina, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 12; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 208. The
churches provided rented space for a child care center, services for the homeless, and other
community organizations. Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 208.
48. Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 213.
49. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
50. See Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (1990) (stating that the
Minnesota Constitution protects against incidental burdens on religion); Hill-Murray Fed'n of
Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 864-65 (Minn. 1992) (adopting a fourfactor compelling interest/narrowly tailored test that is more protective of religious freedom
than the federal Constitution).
51. Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 213.
52. Id. at 204-05.
53. Id. at 204 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (2006)).
54. Id. at 203 ("Both churches are committed to peacemaking and nonviolence, to
maintaining and providing a place of sanctuary, and to using church property in furtherance
of their religious missions."). The state did not challenge the sincerity of the plaintiffs'
beliefs. Id. at 205 n.5.
55. Id. at 203-04. Martin Luther posted his Ninety-Five Theses on a church door,
sparking the Protestant Reformation. See id. at 200. Entrances to Lutheran churches are
associated with not only this historical incident but also the religious liberty associated with
Luther and the Protestant reformers. See id.

1112

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1103

to communicate their prohibition of guns and their request to remove
the guns constituted a burden on their religion by forcing them to alter
these fundamental beliefs. 5 6 The parking lot and tenant provisions
caused similar burdens.57
The court could find no compelling interest in subjecting the
churches to the notice, the parking lot, or to the tenant requirement.5 8
Minnesota law required that the state show that individualized religious
exemptions would harm public safety.59 Although the stated purpose of
the law was to protect individual Second Amendment rights to keep and
bear arms for self-defense, 6° the state did not provide any proof that
churchgoers were being victimized in their parking lots.61 The court also
rejected the state's other asserted interests. 62
Because the court struck down the law under the state constitution,
it did not reach the question of the law's constitutionality under the
federal Free Exercise Clause.63 At one time, federal free exercise claims
were adjudicated using a compelling interest/narrowly tailored

56. Id. at 203-05.
57. Id. at 206-08. Church parking lots are used for funeral processions and other
mission-related activities. Id. at 206-07. The state proposed a "functional" test that would
allow the churches to ban guns when they used their parking lots for religious activities. Id. at
207. The court rejected this option because it would intrude the state even further into
religions because the state would have to monitor the churches' activities on their parking lots
to determine their religious nature. Id. The tenant provision denied the churches "the
opportunity to limit the use of the actual church premises to tenants whose operations are
consistent with the churches' commitment to nonviolence and their opposition to the carrying
of guns. These are the same facilities where religious services are conducted." Id. at 208.
58. Id. at 209-10.
59. Id. at 208.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 209 ("[T]he state presented no evidence in the district court that denying an
exemption to religious institutions would result in the victimization of citizens at church
functions, in church parking lots, or in church building areas used by tenants. The state
therefore did not show that religious practices, including the religious-based exclusion of
weapons from church property and activities, are actually 'inconsistent with public safety."'
(quoting Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (1990)).
62. The state claimed that the parking lot provision of the law advanced the right to
travel while the message provision ensured that citizens received clear and adequate
information about their gun rights. Id. As for the former, the court noted that adequate onstreet parking was available. Id. As for the latter, the court noted that colleges and
universities had considerable flexibility to communicate their policies relating to the
possession of weapons on school property. Id.
63. Id. at 210. It did, however, hold that the law was not a land-use regulation and
therefore was not subject to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Id.
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In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court

rejected the compelling interest standard.'

In its place, it substituted

what seemed like a straightforward standard.

Neutral and generally

applicable laws that only incidentally burdened religion will be analyzed
under a rational basis test.66 A statute receives heightened scrutiny only
if it targets religion or religious practice.67 Congress responded to the
Smith case by adopting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(RFRA), which purported to restore the compelling interest/narrowly
tailored test. 6' The United States Supreme Court struck down RFRA
because it exceeded Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement

power.69
Congress then enacted the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, which restored the compelling interest
64. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981) (noting that the state may
burden religion only if it pursues a compelling government interest with the least restrictive
alternative); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("[O]nly those interests of the
highest order ... can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.");
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("It is basic that no showing merely of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation."' (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945))).
65. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral and generally
applicable laws do not violate Free Exercise Clause).
66. See id. Smith was exceptionally controversial. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The
Supreme Court'sAssault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief That Was Never Filed, 8 J.L.
& RELIGION 99 (1990); Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of
Disrespect,65 U. COLO. L. REV. 519 (1994). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
67. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993) ("At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it
is undertaken for religious reasons."); see also Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and
Individualized Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83
NEB. L. REV. 1178, 1203 (2005) ("[S]trict scrutiny will apply if the religious-liberty claimant
establishes two things: (1) that the State has in place an individualized process or system for
allocating governmental benefits or burdens and (2) that his or her religious-liberty claim has
been rejected under the ad hoc scheme.").
68. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012)).
69. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Religious Freedom
Restoration Act exceeded Congress's power to enforce violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment). Flores, like Smith, seemed to break with prior cases in this area. See, e.g., John
M.A. DiPippa, The Death and Resurrection of RFRA: Integrating Lopez and Boerne, 20 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 767, 771 (1998); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate,
11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 139, 141-44 (2009) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious
Exemption].
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test only for land-use regulations and burdens on institutionalized
persons.7 °
In GeorgiaCarry.org,Inc. v. Georgia, several individuals, a gun rights
organization, and a Baptist church challenged a Georgia law that
prohibited the possession of weapons in a "place of worship. ' 71 The
individual plaintiffs claimed that the law violated their First
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.72 They argued that
the law violated their rights by "prohibiting them from engaging in
activities in a place of worship when those activities are generally
permitted throughout the state. '73 Although the Eleventh Circuit found
that the plaintiffs had standing, 74 it concluded that they failed to state a
free exercise challenge because they omitted any factual matter that
pointed to a burden on a sincerely held religious belief.75 The court
noted that the First Amendment does not protect personal preferences
or secular beliefs 76 and the plaintiffs failed to distinguish their personal
preference to be armed from any religious duty to carry weapons:
70. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012)). The original RFRA still applies to the
actions of the federal government. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) ("Under RFRA, the Federal Government may not, as a
statutory matter, substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, 'even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability."' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (2000))).
RFRA has taken on a higher profile with recent litigation over insurance requirements
imposed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg13(a)(4) (2012)) (establishing minimum coverage requirements for insurance plans including
certain contraceptive services); Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873-82 (July 2, 2013) (codified as amended at
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(2013)) (establishing a religious organizations exemption from paying for
contraceptive services, provided they certify their status); see also Ave Maria Found. v.
Sebelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d 957 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (suggesting that the certification requirement
imposed by federal health care law violates Religious Freedom Restoration Act); E. Tex.
Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 743 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (discussing the Act's
requirements and the development of the regulations concerning religious organizations).
71. GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1249 n.8 (11th Cir. 2012). The
Georgia statute made it a misdemeanor to carry a "weapon or a long gun" in a place of
worship. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b) (2011 & Supp. 2013).
72. GeorgiaCarry.org,687 F.3d at 1255.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1252.
The plaintiffs' fear of prosecution satisfied the injury-in-fact
requirement of standing. See id. The plaintiffs' "serious intent" to violate the statute and the
state's intention to enforce it creates the injury necessary for standing. Id.
75. Id. at 1255.
76. Id. at 1256 ("The Supreme Court has reiterated time and time again that personal
preferences and secular beliefs do not warrant the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.").
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We searched the Amended Complaint to no avail in an attempt
to find factual allegations that could possibly be construed as
alleging that the Carry Law imposes a constitutionally
impermissible burden on one of Plaintiffs' sincerely held
religious beliefs. At various points, Plaintiffs allege that they
would like to carry a handgun in a place of worship for the
protection either of themselves, their family, their flock, or other
members of the Tabernacle. Plaintiffs conclude by alleging that
the Carry Law interferes with their free exercise of religion by
prohibiting them from engaging in activities in a place of worship
when those activities are generally permitted throughout the
State. That Plaintiffs "would like" to carry a firearm in order to
be able to act in "self-defense" is a personal preference,
motivated by a secular purpose. As we note supra, there is no
First Amendment protection for personal preferences; nor is
there protection for secular beliefs."7
The plaintiffs argued that they did not have to show a burden when a
law was not neutral.7 8 They asserted that the law could not be neutral as
to religion if it specifically set houses of worship apart from other
secular property, but according to the court, this mischaracterized
existing Free Exercise Clause precedent. 9 A free exercise complaint
will be dismissed if it "does not allege that (1) the plaintiff holds a belief,
not a preference, that is sincerely held and religious in nature, not
merely secular; and (2) the law at issue in some way impacts the
plaintiff's ability to either hold that belief or act pursuant to that
belief."8 0
Litigants like the ones in GeorgiaCarry.org will have trouble
articulating their claim in religious terms. What exactly is the nature of
the claim? Is it to be armed in general or is it to be armed in church? Is
there a symbolic meaning to carrying weapons in general or specifically
into a place of worship? It may have a basis in a deeply felt cultural or
social imperative, but unless they can point to some theological basis or
religious practice to explain how a ban on gun possession interferes with
their religious practice, neither the Free Exercise Clause nor federal law
will come into play.81 This is where the Georgia plaintiffs foundered.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1255-56.
Id. at 1256-57.
See id.
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They are undoubtedly correct that the law set religion apart, but they
fail the threshold question of whether or not a law burdens a religious
practice. In any event, the Eleventh Circuit seemed skeptical of their
82
claim.
On the other hand, the Minnesota court had no difficulty finding a
religious burden.83 Indeed, the state did not challenge the religious
claim and the existence of a burden seemed almost self-evident to the
court.' Yet deciding what is a religious burden is difficult task that is
not supposed to turn on the court's "perception of the particular belief
or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection."85

"Courts should not ... dissect religious

beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his
position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the
clarity and
86
precision that a more sophisticated person might employ.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF SIKHS AND KIRPANS

While the Baptist plaintiffs in GeorgiaCarry.org had trouble
connecting weapon possession to religious beliefs, Sikhs can make that
claim easily. Their problem, however, is that it must be sanitized and
tamed to receive protection. Sikh men are required to have in their
possession five items, one of which is a curved dagger or sword.87 Here
the religious adherent can persuasively argue that the possession of the
weapon is itself a religious practice.88 A Sikh man can easily show that a
weapon ban substantially burdens his religious practice. The fit between
the state's means and ends becomes the most critical part of the analysis.
82. See id. at 1255 ("Plaintiffs allege that the Carry Law 'interferes with the free
exercise of religion by Plaintiffs by prohibiting them from engaging in activities in a place of
worship when those activities are generally permitted throughout the state.' This so-called
prohibition applies to anyone who enters a place of worship- regardless of the person's
religious preference." (citation omitted)). This seems to conflate the question of religious
burden with the question of the law's neutrality. The question is not whether the law applies
to a person with a different belief about carrying weapons. See id. at 1256-57. The question
is whether or not the law burdens this particular plaintiff's religious beliefs. See id.
83. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
84. Id. at 203-08.
85. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
86. Id. at 715.
87. See Baker, supra note 21, at 15-16; Dipanwita Deb, Note, Of Kirpans, Schools, and
the Free Exercise Clause: Cheema v. Thompson Cuts Through RFRA's Inadequacies, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 877,881-82 (1996).
88. Deb, supra note 87, at 881-82.
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There is considerable litigation, for example, concerning the
requirement for facial hair, especially in the employment and prison
contexts.8 9
In Cheema v. Thompson, the Ninth Circuit found a school district's

weapons ban burdened Sikh children's religious beliefs. 9° The children's
parents challenged the school district's total ban on all weapons. 9

Because the district believed that state law prohibited the possession of
knives on school property, it banned kirpan possession. 2 According to
the court, "[tlhis left the Cheema children with two choices if they
wished to attend school: either leave their kirpans at home (and violate
a fundamental tenet of their religion) or bring them to school (and face
expulsion and/or criminal prosecution)."93 The children remained away
from school while their parents challenged the ban under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. 94

There was no question that the ban burdened a sincerely held
religious belief.95 Unlike the Baptist plaintiffs in Georgia, the Sikh
children could point to a centuries-old, well-articulated tradition
requiring the possession of the kirpan. 96 Although the school district

89. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Religious
Freedom and Inmate Grooming Standards,66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 923 (2012).
90. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1995); see Deb, supra note 87,
at 885-86. The Canadian Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as the Cheema court.
See Multani v. Comm'n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC (Can.)
(stating that a complete ban on weapon possession in schools violated a Sikh child's freedom
of religion); see also BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 1-4 (2013) (arguing
against accommodating the kirpan in schools); Mark S. Kende, Free Exercise of Religion: A
Pragmatic and Comparative Perspective, 55 S.D. L. REV. 412, 419-21 (2010) (discussing
Multani in comparing Canadian courts' approach in religion cases to that of South Africa and
the United States); Allison N. Crawford, Note, Learning Lessons from Multani: Considering
Canada'sResponse to Religious Garb Issues in Public Schools, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
159 (2007). This Article excludes those decisions that have upheld kirpan bans in airports and
other places where security concerns will trump all other issues. Rather, this Article focuses
on those locations where security, while important, is not paramount and subject to some
accommodation.
91. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885.
92. Id. at 884.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 884-85.
95. Id. at 885. Even the dissent agreed completely on this point. See id. at 889 (Wiggins,
J.,
dissenting) ("It is clear that the District's no-knives policy ...substantially burdens [the
children's] free exercise of their religion.").
96. Amarjeet S. Bhachu, Note, A Shield for Swords, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 200-03
(1996).
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had a compelling interest in campus safety, the court held that there
were less restrictive alternatives to a total ban:
But we simply could not conclude that nothing short of a
wholesale ban would adequately protect student safety. The
problem was a total failure of proof; the school district refused to
produce any evidence whatever to demonstrate the lack of a less
restrictive alternative. 97

The court noted that other school districts had successfully
accommodated Sikh children without sacrificing student safety.98 The

court upheld the lower court's injunction that allowed kirpan possession
in schools under the following conditions: that the kirpan have a dull

blade, is about three and one-half inches in length, and is sewn into its
sheath and worn under clothing. 99 These policies apparently were aimed
at making the kirpan unavailable for use by either literally blunting it or
making it inaccessible. The dissent argued that this accommodation did

not serve the district's interest in safety. 10
The knives are
unquestionably dangerous. Even when sewn to their sheaths, they can
still be removed.' 0 '

97. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885. Cheema was decided prior to City of Boerne v. Flores,
where the Supreme Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, at least as it
applied to actions by state and local governments. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508
(1997). RFRA required that state and local government actions that substantially burden a
sincerely held religious belief must be the least restrictive way to advance a compelling state
interest. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 888 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Today, because the weapons ban is
facially neutral as to religion and generally applicable to all students, the school district would
probably only have to show that the weapons ban was reasonably related to a legitimate state
interest in order to survive a free exercise challenge. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). Nevertheless, the case illustrates the recurring problems with religious freedom
claims and the shifting nature of neutrality. Of course, developments in Second Amendment
law provide new legal obstacles to weapons bans. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
98. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885 n.3.
99. Id. at 886.
100. Id. at 890-91 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) ("The district court was presented with an
affidavit from a school secretary who was able to observe Jaspreet Cheema's (supposedly
unnoticeable) kirpan. Worse still, she observed that Jaspreet's 4 year-old brother was
wearing one, too. And, most alarmingly, the secretary stated that Jaspreet told her that 'if
anybody steals from me, I can put this to them.' While making this statement, he grabbed his
kirpan.").
101. Id. at 891.
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Moreover, there was no evidence that the children in question were
any more mature than other children their age and, therefore, should
not have knives available to them during the school day."°

What was more intriguing about the dissent, however, was its direct
analysis of the nature of the actual religious belief at issue. Kirpans
symbolize a Sikh's desire to do "God's Justice.' ' 1

3

Expert testimony at

trial indicated that the weapon was not simply symbolic."
Indeed, a
useless weapon would not serve its religious purpose. Sikhs must carry a
kirpan so that is can be used to defend their religion."°5 According to
plaintiff's expert, only real, functional knives could satisfy the religious
duty to carry the weapon.0 6 Neither carrying a symbolic kirpan nor

riveting it into its sheath would satisfy the religious duty to be armed.

7

Those changes "would alter it and destroy its character as a kirpan. A
kirpan is a knife, not a knife and sheath combination."10 8
The dissent looked at the knife objectively and not through the

subjective, religious lens of the Sikh believer.0 9 If the kirpan is a knife,
then the school district has the right to ban its possession regardless of
its religious significance to Sikh believers. 10
Viewed from this

perspective, the proposed accommodations were incoherent and
ineffective. The injunction allowed the children to carry the weapon if it
was sewn into the sheath and worn under the clothing. 1' But as the

plaintiff's

expert pointed

out, this did not render

the knife

102. The dissent pointed out at least two instances where the children had taken their
knives out of their sheaths. Id. In one instance, they were trying to cut the rope on the flag
pole. Id. In a similar vein, a teacher claimed that she saw the Sikh children attempting to
hoist a kirpan up the flag pole. Id.
103. Id. at 887.
104. Id. at 890.
105. Bhachu, supra note 96, at 203 ("The kirpan, then, is not only part of the identity of
a Khalsa Sikh, but an instrument of self-defense.").
106. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 890 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
107. See id.
108. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
109. Id. ("[W]hile a knife can indeed be a kirpan, and thus have deep spiritual meaning
to a Sikh, this does not change the fact that the underlying object is, still, a knife. In other
words, I would allow the school district, and the district court, to look at what an object is
objectively, rather than through the subjective eyes of a claimant."); see also MARCI A.
HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 116 (2005) (stating
that the dissent considered third party interests along with believer's interests).
110. See Cheema, 67 F.3d at 890 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 886 (majority opinion).
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inaccessible.112 The lower court and the plaintiffs seemed to suggest that
the kirpan was somehow not a knife, but as the dissent pointed out, this
conclusion was belied by the plaintiff's own experts."' Common sense
and religious belief both point to one conclusion: A knife is a knife.
When combined with another required item - the kara - the conclusion

is inescapable: the kirpan is a weapon whose religious significance lies in
its availability to be used in defense of the faith." 4
The district court relied on the accommodations that other school
districts had in place to find that a total ban violated RFRA. 15 But, as
the dissent pointed out, those districts took more assertive measures to
ensure that the kirpan was rendered unusable." 6 If the dissent was
correct, these other policies did not support the more expansive policy
approved by the district court.
Moreover, they also point out the intractability of religious
accommodations in this circumstance.
The other school districts
essentially changed the nature of the kirpan from an actual weapon

112. See id. at 890-91 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 890. The dissent argued that the actual religious belief and practice
required that the kirpan be a real weapon capable of use in defense of the faith. Id. The
dissent pointed to the affidavit of the plaintiff's expert who, "although unintentionally,
revealed that even through the eyes of a Sikh, a kirpan is indeed a weapon." Id. While the
expert stated that a kirpan "'would never be regarded [as a weapon] by a Khalsa Sikh,' he
referred to the kirpan as 'sword' and a 'knife."' Id. (alteration in original). "He explained
that '[a] kirpan must be made of steel and have a curved blade. It is not particularly sharp,
although it is an actual knife or dagger."' Id. (alteration in original). The expert "explained
that another requirement of Khalsa Sikhs is that they wear a steel bracelet, called a kara, at
all times, 'to remind that the sword [kirpan] is to be used only in self defense and the
propagationof justice."' Id. (alteration in original); see also Jeremy Waldron, One Law For
All? The Logic of CulturalAccommodation, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 7 (2002) ("In fact,
the Sikh's religious obligation is an obligation to present himself in public as a combination of
saint and warrior.").
115. See Cheema, 67 F.3d at 892 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 892. The dissent noted that
[t]wo of the three "examples of accommodation" to which the majority referred
involved school districts that only allowed kirpans if the two restrictions the District
forwarded in the present case were followed. Both Yuba City and Live Oak Unified
School Districts only allow kirpans that are no longer than 3 inches in total length,
and even those must be riveted to their sheaths. The third school district to which
the majority referred has different restrictions (a rounded tip and a blunted edge),
that accomplish the same thing: the kirpan is rendered a non-functional knife.
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available for defensive use to a mere symbol.117 It made it so that the
kirpan could no longer serve its actual religious purpose. In Cheema,
the Sikh plaintiffs even argued that the kirpan was not really a knife or a
weapon. 18
The Sikh claim and the dissent's skepticism illustrate the inherent
tension in religious freedom law. Most religious claims are subjective.
That is, they rely on faith in an unseen reality or symbolic actions that
express a religious truth." 9 Their religious significance disappears when
that lens is removed and they are viewed "objectively.' 20 The other
school district's accommodations were typical of the way that minority

religions

must dilute their beliefs to gain accommodation

or

117. See Waldron, supra note 114, at 7 ("[T]here is something patronizing in the view
that the kirpan is carried by the Sikh initiate purely as a matter of religious observance, as
though its ceremonial significance had nothing to do with its significance as a weapon.").
118. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 890.
119. Take, for example, the Roman Catholic practice of lighting candles during special
services. See The Roman Missal and the Easter Vigil, U.S. CONF. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://
www.usccb.org/prayer-and-worship/liturgical-year/triduum/roman-missal-and-the-easter-vigil.
cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3NS2-CZ6Q. The Easter Vigil
service, for example, begins in darkness. Id. The priest solemnly enters the church carrying
the Paschal candle, a large candle symbolizing that Jesus is the light of the world. See id. The
congregation holds individual candles, which are lit from the single flame of the Paschal
candle. See id. The people pass this light from candle to candle until all the candles are lit.
See id. These remain the only source of light until later in the service, when they are
extinguished and the church lights are dramatically turned on. See id. To the believer, this
expresses deep and important meaning. See id. The candles are more than burning wicks, but
to an objective fire inspector, they are a potential fire hazard. See, e.g., Sonja Barisic, Symbol
of Salvation, or Fire Hazard? Fire MarshalBans Candles Held by Worshipers, LUDINGTON
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 8, 1993, at 2, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=110&da
t=19930408&id=7LcLAAAAIBAJ&sjid=3IUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=7268,544463, archivedat ht
tp://perma.cc/JZN2-D97V; Easter Vigil Dispute: Archbishop Appeals Hand-Held Candle Ban,
BEAVER CNTY. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al, availableat http://news.google.com/newspapers?n
id=2002&dat=19930408&id=27QiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ErUFAAAAIBAJ&pg=4923,1623939,
archived at http://perma.cc/3BBD-RSV5. It is probable that cities have granted exemptions
for such services, but this only illustrates a further problem: majority religions find it easy to
acquire accommodations for this practice even if "objectively" dangerous, while minority
religions may not be so successful.
120. For example, Roman Catholics believe that the consecrated host is the real body of
Jesus Christ. See The Real Presence of Jesus Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist:Basic
Questions and Answers, U.S. CONF. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/prayer-and-w
orship/the-mass/order-of-mass/liturgy-of-the-eucharist/the-rea-presence-of-jesus-christ-in-the
-sacrament-of-the-eucharist-basic-questions-and-answers.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/WKY2-FPG8. Objectively, the host is a wafer of unleavened
bread, but the believer does not treat it as such. Rather, the belief in the Real Presence
compels believers to act reverently toward the host and to take steps to prevent its misuse or
destruction. Id. But seen from the dissent's perspective, the host remains a dry wafer and
that is how the law should see it.

1122

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1103

acceptance. 121 Indeed, the policy in the reported decision illustrates this,
too. The school district's accommodations suggested that they believed
they had "neutralized" the knives' danger without also recognizing that
truly doing so emptied the practice of religious significance.
Brian Leiter uses the kirpan example as a central feature of his
position that religious practices should not be given special
constitutional exemptions from general laws. 2 2 Leiter posits two
hypothetical boys: one boy, a Sikh who carries a knife to fulfill a
religious obligation, and the other boy, a young man in a rural
community who is given a knife as a cultural rite of passage to
manhood. 23 Leiter is puzzled by the different treatment these boys
would receive if they sought to bring their knives to school:
There is no Western democracy, at present, in which the [rural]
boy.., has prevailed or would prevail in a challenge to a general
prohibition on the carrying of weapons in the school. Were he a
Sikh he would stand a good chance of winning. But if he can
only appeal to a century-old tradition, central to his identity, to
which he feels categorically bound by his family traditions and
upbringing, he is out of luck. 24
Leiter notes that the Multani decision upheld the right of the Sikh
children to wear real knives if they held a sincere personal and religious
belief in its importance.12 The court noted the unique characteristics of
schools that distinguished them from places like courthouses and
airports, where the kirpan could be banned. 26 Yet, as Leiter points out,
the court failed to consider those circumstances in which schools may be
uniquely vulnerable to violence from weapons carried on students'

121. See Cheema, 67 F.3d at 892 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Religious belief and practice
must often be sanitized, tamed, or modified. See Stephen M. Feldman, A ChristianAmerica
and the Separation of Church and State, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY

261, 262-66 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) [hereinafter Feldman, ChristianAmerica].
122. LEITER, supranote 90, at 64-67.
123. Id. at 1-3.
124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 64-65; see also Multani v. Comm'n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006 1
S.C.R. 256 (Can. S.C.C.).
126. See Multani v. Comm'n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.
S.C.C.) (declaring that schools are partnerships that can control their environment better than
other public spaces); LEITER, supra note 90, at 64-66.
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persons. 127 He cannot see why the justifications for banning the kirpan
in other places do not apply equally to schools. 12 And, if the Sikh child
can carry a real knife in school, then he cannot see any difference with
the sincere claim of the rural child to carry his knife.'29 Ultimately, he
concludes that the two boys should be treated the same and that they
should both lose. 3 ' Religious exemptions from general laws should not
be granted "unless those exemptions do not shift burdens or risks onto
'
others." 131

Leiter's principle suggests a different approach in the
GeorgiaCarry.organd Edina cases. Not only can the plaintiffs rely on a
sustained and sincere tradition (especially in the south), they have also
built their claim on a religious foundation.'32 The right (if not the duty)
of self-defense is well established in Christian theology.13 3 Granting
them an exemption from the gun law would not shift the burden to
anyone else. Unlike children who are compelled to be in school, no
adult is forced to attend any particular church.'
Churchgoers who
object to fellow members being armed are free to find a church with
beliefs and practices more compatible with their own.
Even if the right is not religious in nature, it points out how
problematic it is for courts to distinguish religious beliefs from
convictions of conscience. In GeorgiaCarry.org,the church's desire to
be armed for self-defense grew out of not only a long tradition but also a
shooting in a nearby church.135 Their desire could be a religious belief or
a conviction of conscience, deeply and sincerely held, as well as a secular
preference for safety. Leiter is skeptical that religious claims should be

127. LEITER, supra note 90, at 65-66 (noting the general lack of armed guards, the
immaturity of the students, and the natural and inevitable "antagonistic relationships" among
students and between faculty and students).
128. Id. at 66.
129. See id. at 66-67 ("[T]here is no principled reason for legal or constitutional regimes
to single out religion for protection.").
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id.; see also HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 116 (criticizing the Cheema majority for
"thinking only in terms of the needs of the believer").
132. I will assume its sincerity for the moment.
133.

See infra Part V.

134. Of course, children are present during a worship service, but they are typically in a
room surrounded by adults, the exact opposite of the makeup of elementary and secondary
schools.
135.

See Whitman, supranote 12, at 1988-89.
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given special exemptions when secular claims of conscience will not.1 36
In the end, Leiter's counsel is to limit the reach of religious exemptions
because a principled application of a broad exemption for conscience
would include so many claims that it "would appear to amount to a
137
legalization of anarchy.,
On the other hand, the Edina churches' claims for exemptions from
the signage and request requirements set religion apart from every other
private establishment.1 38 The law imposed little additional burden on
the religious establishment that other private establishments did not
share. Rather, their religious claim allowed them to be set apart from a
law that everyone else had to follow. Per Leiter, there is no principled
way to justify this exception, especially when the burden on religious
practice is almost non-existent. 39
When it comes to possession of a kirpan, however, the more precise
the believer articulates his belief, the less likely he is to gain protection.
The Sikh plaintiffs in Cheema and their fellow Sikhs in the other schools
mentioned in the opinion had to water down the significance of the
kirpan in order to carry it in schools. 40 If they had claimed that the
religious significance of the kirpan was that it be available for use in selfdefense, they would have lost their case. Religious gun owners face a
similar challenge. Unlike the Sikh's, the GeorgiaCarry.org plaintiffs
could not articulate a clear theological or historical justification for gun
possession in church. 141 Rather, as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out,
they were left asserting what sounded like a personal preference. 42
There is a religious argument for gun possession, but articulating it will
drag courts into evaluating the reasonableness of the religious belief, a
143
place where courts do not want to go.
136. See LEITER, supranote 90, at 94-97.
137. Id. at 94.
138. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
139. LEITER, supra note 90, at 54-67.
140. See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F. 3d 883, 895 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wiggens, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 884 (majority opinion) (describing the kirpan as a "ceremonial
knife").
141. GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255-58 (11th Cir. 2012).
142. Id. at 1258.
143. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) (stating that courts
should not determine plausibility or place of religious claim); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S.
680, 699 (1989) (arguing that the judiciary is not competent to determine centrality of
religious belief or practice); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1981) (stating that
the judiciary should not ask whether a claimant's religious understanding is correct).
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V. IS THERE A RELIGIOUS DUTY OF SELF DEFENSE?

David Kopel argues for a religious duty of self-defense, a duty that
presumably prevents states from prohibiting gun possession.1
He
accurately, if tendentiously, 45 relates the history of the traditional
Christian reliance on the just war theory.14 He argues that Western
Christianity's recent emphasis on "pacifism" is a departure from
traditional doctrine. 147 He concludes that, at least in the Roman
Catholic tradition, "states and families" have a religious duty of selfdefense. 4 He relies on Vatican documents that discuss this duty in the
context of governments intervening in other states to prevent abuses of
human rights.'4 9 Indeed, these very documents approve gun control
measures for individuals.' 0 Kopel agrees with the documents until this
point where he interposes secular constitutional rights to bear arms to
refute the Vatican's conclusion.' 5 ' Kopel conflates the duty of civil
authorities to defend their people with the duty of individuals to be
armed.'52 One can agree that an individual may act in self-defense
without also concluding that that individual must be armed at all times.
At the same time, Kopel correctly points out that mainstream
religions have always approved of the use of force in some
circumstances, not the least of which was for individual self-defense.'53
To that extent, churches like those in the Edina case have weaker
religious claims than the plaintiffs in GeorgiaCarry.org. This is a
disagreement among Christians about the interpretation of Scripture
and Tradition, the authority of institutional interpretation as opposed to
individual interpretation, and the relative importance of one over the
other. 5 4 In other words, these are religious disputes. To resolve them,
one must engage the materials and come to a religious conclusion. The

144. Kopel, Evolving Attitudes, supra note 20, at 1764-65 ("[Airmed defense was a
"right" and a "duty" fQr families and for nations.").
145. Id. at 1763 (describing the 2003 military action in Iraq as a "liberation").
146. Id. at 1714-19.
147. Id. at 1769 ("[T]oday pacifism has greater respectability within orthodox
Christianity than any time in the past 1700 years.").
148. See id. at 1764-65.
149. Id. at 1764-66.
150. Id. at 1765.
151. Id. at 1765-66.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 1714-19.
154. See Kopel, Evolving Attitudes, supra note 20.
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problem, of course, is that this is exactly what courts should not do in
free exercise cases.
VI. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ISSUES IN CATEGORICAL AND OPT-OUT
JURISDICTIONS

In categorical jurisdictions, places of worship feel singled out
because the law specifically excludes religious property. 55 State laws
that categorically prohibit the possession of guns in churches are not
neutral as to religion. That is, unlike laws that treat churches the same
as any other private property owner, categorical exclusions carved out a
special exception for churches.
Other pieces of property are also categorically excluded. Often
statutes will prohibit possession of guns not only in churches but also in
schools, government buildings, and other places where large groups may
gather.'56
This suggests that there are non-religious reasons for
prohibiting gun possession in churches. The state may argue health and
safety, ease of enforcement, or other similar arguments. 57 Churches will
claim, however, that they are singled out because they vary so widely in
their size, location, and practice.'58
That is, the other places
categorically excluded all have similar features. For example, schools
will not vary largely in size. They will all contain minors or vulnerable
individuals, and they all house people for considerable periods of the
day. Churches, on the other hand, range in size from the mega church
to the living room church. Moreover, these churches will have vastly
different missions and vastly different practices. For some, it would be
unthinkable to allow their members to be armed." 9 But for others the
question may be much closer."6 Thus, they argue that the categorical
exclusion of churches is not neutral as to religion because it privileges
one particular theology about weapons and peace.
In opt-out jurisdictions, however, gun laws are neutral as to religion.
For example, the Minnesota concealed carry law does not single out

155.
156.
157.
Ct. App.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012).
E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b) (2011 & Supp. 2013).
See, e.g., Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 208-09 (Minn.
2008).
See, e.g., id. at 212-13.
See, e.g., Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 203.
See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.org,687 F.3d at 1249 n.8.
See id. at 1255-59.
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churches.162 Rather, it includes churches in the general description of
private establishments and imposes on them the same duties and
responsibilities as other private establishments. 163 Thus, the law is
neutral because it simply requires churches who object to the presence
of guns on their property to follow the same steps as other private
establishments. Here the problem for the church is getting past the
neutrality and general applicability threshold. That is, the church can
show a real burden to its religious belief and practice, but a court will
never get to that question under the federal Constitution unless the
church can show the law's lack of neutrality.1 64
Pro-gun churches will not be able to show any religious significance
to their beliefs, while anti-gun churches will not be able to show that the
laws are targeted at religion. The pro-gun churches will have to allege a
"theology of gun possession" that may be manufactured only for the
litigation. Courts would have to examine the theological basis of the
pro-gun claim in order to determine whether or not the law burdens
religion.165 Perhaps that is why courts easily glide over the burden issue
to rule on other facets of the analysis,166 but ignoring the burden
question in these gun cases is impossible. The Minnesota courts were
seemingly persuaded by theological and religious claims of the
plaintiffs. 167 That may also be true for the Eleventh Circuit's decision.
It created a distinction between "personal preferences" and "religious
beliefs."'6 8 Apparently, the plaintiff churches in that case could1 69not
frame their arguments in terms religious enough to satisfy the court.

162. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(a)-(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015).

163. See id.; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 201-02.
164. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral and generally
applicable laws do not violate Free Exercise Clause).
165. See Edina,745 N.W.2d at 207, 210-13.
166. See id. at 211 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
167. David Kopel might suggest that this was because of the Western church's pacifism
and reliance on sentiment instead of reason. Kopel, Evolving Attitudes, supra note 20, at
1749-50.
168. See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1256-58 (11th Cir. 2012).
169. See id. at 1258-59.
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VII.THREE PERSISTENT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROBLEMS

A. The Non-MainstreamReligion Problem

Although these cases are not likely to dominate free exercise
dockets, they illustrate several ongoing free exercise issues. First, they
show how difficult it is for courts to conceptualize religion claims,
Scholars have long
especially for non-mainstream religions. 170
documented the difficulties non-mainstream religions have winning free
exercise claims.' 7' Courts may more readily find religious burdens when
a mainstream religion's claim does not challenge the conventional
assumptions about "normal" religious belief and practices.'72 These
religions are so identified with majoritarian interests that it is difficult to
see them as separate from them.'73

Although most free exercise claimants lose, of the successful
claimants, majority religions win more often than non-majority
religions.'74 Successful free exercise claims by minority religions are
even less frequent.'75 Mainstream Christian religions may find that
170. See Feldman, Religious Minorities,supra note 19, at 251-59.
171. See, e.g., Feldman, ChristianAmerica, supra note 121; Samuel J. Levine, Toward a
Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious Minority
Perspective,5 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 153, 160-62 (1996); Frank S. Ravitch, A Crack in the
Wall: Pluralism,Prayer,and Pain in the Public Schools, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 121, at 296, 296-303. But see Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions
and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 922 (2004) ("[P]rotection ... of minority
faiths should not be the sole criterion for Religion Clause cases."); Rosalie Berger Levinson,
First Monday -The Dark Side of Federalism in the Nineties: Restricting Rights of Religious
Minorities, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47 (1998); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square:
Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499 (1998); David E.
Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77 (1991).
172. See Feldman, Religious Minorities,supra note 19, at 251-59.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 196-205. Nevertheless, unless a court uses a
higher standard than currently used by the Supreme Court, the challengers may still lose
because the laws are neutral and generally applicable. Compare Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew,
733 F.3d 72, 99 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 683 (2013) (holding that the insurance
requirement did not violate Free Exercise Clause because Affordable Care Act neutral and
generally applicable), with Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Sebelius, 10 F. Supp. 3d 725
(E.D. Tex. 2014) (holding that the insurance requirement violated RFRA).
174. See James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals
Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the
Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 250-51 (1999) (stating that 38.9% of
the winners were from mainstream Catholic and Protestant religions compared to 24.5% from
non-mainstream religions).
175. Stephen Feldman argues that non-majority religions win a few free exercise claims
but non-Christian minority religions rarely do. Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 19,
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legislatures are less likely to interfere with majoritarian practices, and if
they do, judges are more receptive because they more readily identify
with the claimants and their practices. 7 6 Stephen Feldman describes
how litigators for Jewish claimants in the early modern religion cases
framed their claims to reflect majority, Protestant interests.177 Thus,
even when minority religions win, they often do so because their
interests align with majoritarian interests and values.'78
This preference for mainstream claims can be seen in the different
outcomes

of the

Edina and

the

GeorgiaCarry.org cases.

In

GeorgiaCarry.org,the court could find no justification for the claim that
the law burdened any religious beliefs.'79 The plaintiffs in Edina
received a more sympathetic reception. The court simply asserted that
there was no doubt that the law burdened the plaintiffs' religion, and the

at 251 (non-Christian religions never win at the Supreme Court level); see also Feldman,
Christian America, supra note 121, at 273 n.5 (arguing that potential non-Christian religion
free exercise victories are "ambiguous").
176. See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 19, at 252 ("America is a
predominantly Christian nation. It therefore is not unreasonable to suppose that Christians
should receive preferential treatment at the hands of the Court. Christians probably are less
likely to find that the exercise of their religion is burdened by laws in the first place. Because
of the majoritarian process, lawmakers are less likely to adopt laws that place burdens on
adherents of Christianity, the majority religion. If, however, Christians do find themselves in
court defending the exercise of their religion, the judiciary is likely to be receptive to their
claims. Primarily, this is because Christian judges should be more likely to be sympathetic to
the plight of fellow Christians. The religious burden may appear more 'substantial,' or the
governmental interests may seem less 'compelling' when they burden Christians than when
they burden non-Christians. Therefore, mainstream Christians should prevail more often
than non-Christians in free exercise cases." (quoting Brent, supra note 174, at 248)).
177. Id. at 249.
178. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221,225, 235 (1972) (noting approvingly
that the Amish fell within a long tradition of self-reliance); see also Linda C. McClain, Against
Agnosticism: Why the Liberal State Isn't Just One (Authority) Among the Many, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1319, 1337 (2013) ("[T]here was a congruence between Amish values and venerated
American values.
). Derek Bell pointed out a similar dynamic in school desegregation
and civil rights cases. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). This dynamic plays itself out in civil
rights cases, too. See id. at 524-25 (suggesting that African-American plaintiffs win when
their interests coincide with the white majority); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two
Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE
L.J. 470 (1976) (arguing that mainstream interests of lawyers took precedence over interests
of community).
179. GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012).
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state conceded the sincerity of the belief.18° It is not self-evident,
however, what the burden actually was.
The plaintiffs objected to two requirements: that they put up a sign
with state-mandated wording to put people on notice of their no-gun
policy and that they allow permit holders to have their guns on church
parking lots.'81 The churches noted their commitment to peace and nonviolence, but there was nothing in either regulation that interfered with
these beliefs.'82 Indeed, there was little in the law that interfered with
their practices either. 183 The churches' prohibition on weapons
continued unabated whether they were categorically exempt or if they
posted notice.'84 Minnesota's law accommodated the rights of private
establishments, a category that surely includes places of worship.185
Declaring that guns were forbidden was an accurate statement of
their religious beliefs,186 and by doing so, the law allowed them to
continue their practices. Similarly, the parking lot provision could only
plausibly constitute a burden in those few times when the lot was used
for religious practice. 8 7 Even then, the guns would remain in vehicles
and not be on any participant. Moreover, as the court noted, public, onand off-street parking was readily available.'88 It would not be much
more difficult for a person to gain access to a weapon in nearby onstreet parking as it would be in the church parking lot.
The ease with which the court found this burden is consistent with
the way courts treat claims by mainstream religions. 89 Non-violence
seems like a "natural" religious position. 190 The presence of weapons,
even in locked cars, suggests the possibility of violence. Therefore, it
180. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 203-208 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008).
181. Id. at 202.
182. See id. 203.

183. Id. at 204-08.
184. See id.
185. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(b)(4)(d) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015). Churches

own an estimated $300 billion to $500 billion in untaxed church property. Jeff Schweitzer,
The Church of America, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonp
ost.com/jeff-schweitzer/robert-jeffress-romney b_1002753.html, (last updated Dec. 11, 2011,
5:12 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/256E-4GM5.
186. See Edina,745 N.W.2d at 200.
187. See id. at 206-07.
188. Id. at 209.
189. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
190. Kopel, Evolving Attitudes, supra note 20 (claiming that Western Christian churches
moved toward pacifism during the twentieth century).
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was "obvious" that the law burdened religion. The GeorgiaCarry.org

plaintiffs had to fight this perception. They wanted their parishioners to
be armed for their and the congregation's protection, 9 ' but this runs
directly counter to the "natural" perception that religion and places of
worship are refuges from violence."9
Yet places of worship are
victimized by violence.'9 3 Most faiths have developed theological
justifications for the use of violence in certain circumstances. 194 Thus, far

from being in the mainstream, pacifism may be the exception for
American religions. 195
Discerning a burden is a difficult task, 196 but asking courts to find a

burden on religion without inquiring into the religious basis for the
191. GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d at 1249 n.8.
192. See Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 199-200.
193. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 12, at 1988-89; Shaila Dewan, Hate for Liberals and
Gay People Drove Gunman, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A15; Steven Yaccino,
Michael Schwirtz & Marc Santora, Gunman Kills 6 at Sikh Temple Near Milwaukee, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2012, at Al; Hayley Mason & Nancy Amons, Woman Dies From Injuries in
Cookeville Church Shooting,WSMV (Feb. 2, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://www.wsmv.com/story/24
612934/fatal-shooting-inside-cookeville-church, (last updated Mar. 2, 2014, 11:53 AM),
archived at http://perma.cc/F3JS-KZ5E. Indeed, the incidents near Milwaukee and Knoxville
were cited by the federal government in 2013 when it released a guide to help houses of
worship deal with active shooters. See FEMA, GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING HIGH-QUALITY
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS FOR HOUSES OF WORSHIP 23 (2013), available at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33007, archived at http://perma.cc/8VFS6W2U. One of its recommendations is to fight back. Id. at 30. ("If neither running nor hiding
is a safe option, as a last resort, when confronted by the shooter, adults in immediate danger
should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and
items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers or chairs."). The guide goes on to
suggest that houses of worship should come up with "policies on the control and presence of
weapons, as permitted by law." Id. (emphasis added).
194. See generally David B. Kopel, The Catholic Second Amendment, 29 HAMLINE L.
REV. 519 (2006) (addressing, among other topics, the catechism and canon law on selfdefense and just war); David B. Kopel, The Torah and Self-Defense, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 17
(2004) (discussing Jewish "teachings on the right to ... defend oneself and others").
195. See, e.g., Kopel, Religious Roots, supra note 20 (religious sentiment at the founding
saw self-defense as a sacred duty). This does not contradict the claim that non-mainstream
religions find it difficult to win free exercise cases. See Feldman, Christian America, supra
note 121. This is not a theological or analytical process. That is, courts do not investigate the
theological or historical background of the claims in front of them. Rather, they operate
based on social and cultural assumptions about what is "normal" or "natural." That Western
religions might justify the use of force is not at the forefront of the judicial mind. Rather, the
non-violence claims fall within a contemporary narrative of peaceful religion while the
possession of weapons falls outside that narrative.
196. See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 419, 425 & n.28 (2009) (comparing part of the analysis in Heller to discerning a burden
in free exercise cases).
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practice may be asking too much of them. Judges are subject to the
same cognitive, cultural and social biases as everyone else."i "Religion"
powerfully frames the issue and activates deep cognitive processes. As
Professor Krotoszynski notes,
The very notion of "religion" triggers deep-seated, largely
unconscious cultural associations and understandings. To ask
someone to characterize a particular group as a "religion"
requires her to draw a material equivalency between the beliefs
of the group in question and her own beliefs; if the equivalency
seems unwarranted because of the bizarre nature of the group's
theology, she might well prove unwilling to accept that the other
group is a legitimate "religion" in the same way as her own.
political behavior is
"The attitude that most affects social and 198
prejudice against people who are different.
When faced with ideas or behavior at odds with our own, cognitive
dissonance results. 199 We reduce that dissonance by removing the

disagreeable idea or behavior." ° Because there is no legal definition of
religion for free exercise purposes, a judge must subconsciously evaluate
the authenticity of the claim and the claimant.201 An individual
confronted with a religious belief that she views as unusual or bizarre
may cause her to discount that belief and reaffirm her own.20 2 Judges
197. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searchingfor the Soul of
Judicial Decisionmaking:An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 491 (2004) (noting that the religion of the claimant, the judge, and the community are the
most salient features of judicial decision making).
198. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free
Exercise, and the (Underappreciated)Merits of Smith, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1189, 1235 (2008)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting JOSEPH F. BYRNES, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 151
(1984)).
199. See generally PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING,
DECISION MAKING, AND

PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A

GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND

POLICYMAKERS 366 (2010) (summarizing cognitive dissonance theory with references).

200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 954 (1989) ("[T]he questioning of sincerity may
operate invisibly and subconsciously against unknown or unpopular religions. The more
unusual a claimant's religion, the easier it will be for decisionmakers to conclude, on the basis
of an unarticulated view that 'no one could really believe this,' that the claimant's beliefs are
not sincerely held."); Marshall, supra note 66, at 311 ("Minority belief systems -not majority
belief systems - will bear the brunt of the definition and the sincerity inquiries.").
202. See Krotoszynski, supra note 198, at 1235; see also Stephen M. Feldman,
Empiricism, Religion, and Judicial Decision-Making, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 47
(2006) ("When tangible conflicts between social groups arise, the cohesion within each
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who must decide if a neutral law burdens an "unusual or bizarre" belief
will likely employ cognitively similar tactics.2 3 The decisions of the
federal courts may reflect this process of dividing claims into acceptable
and unacceptable religions.2z 4 The result is that non-mainstream
religions bring more and lose more free exercise cases than mainstream
religions.2 °5
The very nature of religious claims makes them difficult to translate
into contemporary legal categories. 2°6 The translation process sanitizes
them or leaves them impossible to understand by a "rational" and

respective group and the salience of the division between groups are both likely to
increase."); Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal's Entrenchment of Majority Group
Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 1461-62 (2010)
(stating that the federal bench is "remarkably homogenous" compared to general
population).
203. Krotoszynski, supra note 198, at 1193 ("[P]ervasive social hostility to religions that
maintain nontraditional belief systems leads judges to discount the relative importance of
religiously motivated behavior that conflicts with a neutral law of general applicability; courts
either find that the governmental policy in question does not "burden" the religion (or
burdens it only indirectly) or, alternatively, find that the legislative goals advanced by the law
actually advance a compelling interest in a narrowly tailored way."). "The decisions of the
federal courts reflect the same sort of effort to classify religion into acceptable denominations
verses unacceptable cults." Id. at 1241.
204. See id. at 1240-41.
205. Id. at 1244-45 ("The pattern is reasonably clear: minority religious groups bring far
more cases than do more traditional majority religious groups. But even though minority
religionists bring far more cases, their success rate in the federal courts is much lower.
Minority religionists bring and lose more cases; majority religionists bring fewer cases and win
a larger percentage of them." (footnotes omitted)); Marshall, supra note 66, at 311 (arguing
that a negative outcome is more likely "when the religion is bizarre, relative to the cultural
norm," or "when the belief in question is, by cultural norms, incredulous"); Gregory C. Sisk &
Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: EmpiricalEvidence from the
Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 235 (2012) (noting that Muslims faced substantial
disadvantage in religious liberty cases compared to other religious groups). But see Gregory
C. Sisk, How Traditionaland Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence from
Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (2005) (stating that the hypothesis
that minority or unconventional religions are at a disadvantage in court is not supported by
study's data).
206. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 473, 478 (1996) ("For the faithful, the ultimate authority and source of truth is
extrahuman, and evidence can- and in some religious traditions, must -be entirely personal
to the individual; for the reasonable, both the source and the evidence for the truth lie in
common human observation, experience, and reasoning. To have faith is to affirm a
transcendent reality, different from that observed by nonbelievers."); see also Donald L.
Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right Require a Narrow Definition of "Religion"?, 39
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357 (2011) (arguing that modern religious diversity necessitates an
expansive definition of religion).
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"objective" analysis. 0 7 In a world that has long since declared God's
death, claims of religious truth and obligation fail to resonate. 20 8 As
Professor Paulsen argues, true religious claims are different from other
obligations, however deeply felt.
The nature of religious obligation is intrinsically different from
philosophical or moral belief systems that involve no conception
of a transcendent Creator, God. The believer understands
himself to be under the superior authority of God. The ethical
humanist, secularist, or atheist does not; he does not believe in
God. Rather, he is subject to the moral commands he discerns
for himself. (In a very real sense, the atheist is "God" for
himself, the only ultimate authority over his own2 9conscience. He
really is, in Smith's words, "a law unto himself.")
Religion not only assumes a command superior to the state's, it also
plays a central role in one's identity.1 0 Perhaps, then, the only burdens
the Free Exercise Clause should care about are those that leave the
individual with a stark choice: violate the law or violate your religion.
Courts should only protect those infringements that go to the heart of
one's religious practice and identity: where following one's secular
obligations is not merely inconvenient but fundamentally inconsistent
with one's religious principles. Preventing Sikh children from taking
their kirpan into schools is such a choice.2 t1 It is not clear that
preventing Baptists from taking their guns into their church service is

207. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39
PEPP. L. REV. 1159 (2013).
208. See Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of
Religion in the Post-ModernAge, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163; Paulsen, supra note 207.

209. Paulsen, supra note 207, at 1203 (quoting Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885
(1990)). But see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G.
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007).

SAGER, RELIGIOUS

210. Abner S. Greene, ConstitutionalReductionism, Rawls, and the Religion Clauses, 72

FORDHAM L. REV. 2089, 2091
based in an extrahuman source
(accommodating religion does
32-36 (suggesting that there

(2004) ("Religion, on my argument, is different because it is
of normative authority."). But see HAMILTON, supra note 109
not create more good than harm); LEITER, supra note 90, at
is no difference between identity and obligation); Micah

Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1401 (2012)

("[R]eligion is not morally distinctive....").
211. "A religious dictate ... is more than a question of identity; it is a duty." Michael
W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 799-800 (2013)
[hereinafter McConnell, Why Protect] (reviewing LEITER, supra note 90) (discussing Brian
Leiter's comparison of a Sikh child's religious obligation to carry the kirpan and a rural
child's conscientious desire to carry a pocket knife); see also LEITER, supra note 90, at 1-3.
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the same thing.2 12 Yet such a harsh standard would involve the courts
even more deeply in purely religious questions,213 carve out a huge space
for government to occupy in the lives of citizens,214 215and ultimately
devalue the role of religious belief in an individual's life.
B. The Exemption Problem
Second, these cases are part of the larger debate about how easy it
should be to get religious exemptions from general laws. 16 Too easy

212. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 90, 1-3 (comparing a rural boy who receives a pocket
knife as a rite of passage and the Sikh boy who carries the kirpan as part of his religious
identity).
213. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (stating that courts must not determine the
importance or the plausibility of religious claims); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989) (noting that centrality of religious belief not for judiciary to decide); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.").
214. Hamilton notes the increasing libertarianism of modern day free exercise
jurisprudence. See HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 206. Some scholars have argued that
modern Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is about protection of individual autonomy. See,
e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 9, 93 (2004). Others claim that this modern focus is misplaced and that equality of
religion (or conscience) is the correct focus of the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Bret Boyce,
Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 493, 552 (2009) ("The free
exercise of religion requires equal and impartial treatment of all regardless of their beliefs,
not a patchwork of special privileges, favors, and exemptions."); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasis for Protecting
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994); William P. Marshall, What is the Matter
with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 194 (2000) (stating that equality serves as a
"center of gravity, assuring that the constitutional status of religion does not veer too far in
any one direction").
215. See Laycock, Religious Exemption, supra note 69, at 176 (noting that without
exemptions the right to believe is "hollow").
216. See, e.g., ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES
OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3-4 (2012) (suggesting that broad exemptions
are necessary to accommodate plural authorities); Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and

Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 477 (1999) (explaining that the
pluralist understanding of authority is more compatible with constitutional order). Compare
McConnell, Why Protect, supra note 211 (arguing for constitutional religious exemptions on
originalist grounds), with Philip Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight of Religious Exemption:
An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916-17 (1992) (arguing against
religious exemptions on originalist grounds), and Schwartzman, supra note 210, at 1406
(stating that there is no consensus among originalists on the issue of free exercise
exemptions). But see Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 574 (1998)
(concluding there is no plausible explanation of why only religious believers are
constitutionally entitled to exemptions from general laws); McClain, supra note 178
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acceptance of religious claims would cause unnecessary expense and
enforcement difficulties even, perhaps, chaos. 217 Too stingy an approach
and religious freedom becomes an empty promise.218
Two leading religion clause scholars, Professors Marci Hamilton and
Douglas Laycock, recently engaged in a sometimes vitriolic debate on
this issue.2 19

Hamilton argues that we should be wary of granting

religious exemptions from general laws because religions have caused
significant social harm.22 Judicially crafted exemptions through the
Free Exercise Clause allow courts, which are not equipped to deal with
weighing of complex social and cultural factors, to pick and choose
social and political winners and losers. 221 Exemptions should only be
given by legislatures on a case-by-case basis when no significant harm to
others will result.
Exempting religious conduct from neutral, general laws must be
(1) duly enacted by a legislature, not decreed by a court; (2) must
be debated under the harsh glare of public scrutiny; and (3) must
be consistent with the larger public good. Where the burden on
religious conduct can be lifted by the legislature with only de
minimis harm to the public, there is good reason to
accommodate the religious conduct.222
Laycock critiques this position in a no-holds-barred book review. 223
He calls it a "dreadful book" and most of it a "poorly executed rant (suggesting that broad exemptions may undermine state's interest in equality and in
protecting children).
217. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (suggesting that broad exemptions would be "courting
anarchy"); LEITER, supra note 90, at 94 (noting that broad exemptions could be something
like "anarchy"); see also, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(involving a for-profit company that objected to four of twenty contraceptive methods
required to be included in health insurance plan).
218. Laycock, Religious Exemption, supra note 69, at 176 ("Regulatory exemptions are
an essential part of meaningful religious liberty. The right to believe a religion is hollow
without the right to practice the religion; it leaves committed believers subject to persecution
for exercising their religion.").
219. Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Laycock, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1189
(2007); Douglas Laycock, God vs. the Gavel: A Brief Rejoinder, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1545
(2007); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169 (2007) [hereinafter
Laycock, Syllabus of Errors] (reviewing HAMILTON, supra note 109).
220. HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 274 ("[Rjeligious entities can be responsible for
lethal medical neglect of children, childhood sexual abuse, [and] the takeover of neighboring
property owner's rights under the zoning laws,... among other conduct.").
221. See id. at 275.
222. Id.
223. See Laycock, Syllabus of Errors,supra note 219.
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disorganized, self-contradictory, and riddled with errors. ' 224 Laycock
charges that Hamilton accuses courts for being overly sensitive to
religious claims while ignoring the same thing in legislatures. 225 To
Laycock, judicially crafted exemptions can protect religious freedom.226
Judges are removed from politics and, thus, less likely to be swayed by
political influence.227 This distance also allows judges to more carefully
sift facts and evaluate claims.228
This debate about the proper institution to grant exemptions is only
a symptom of their more fundamental disagreement. Hamilton fears
22 9
religion's influence in modern society, while Laycock is agnostic.
Hamilton's calculus leads her to the conclusion that broad religious
exemptions cause more harm than good. 2 0 No group, religious or not,
224. Id. at 1169.
225. Id. at 1173 ("Legislators have exempted harmful religious behavior that no judge
would ever exempt under a generally applicable standard -most notably, parents refusing to
provide medical care for their children.").
226. See id. at 1177 ("Hamilton's examples show that judges are less likely to grant
foolish exemptions that result in serious harm. Judges sometimes are willing to protect
unpopular minorities, but legislators hardly ever; legislators cannot afford to protect any
group that is seriously unpopular with voters."); see also Michael J. Perry, Freedom of
Religion in the United States: Fin de Sidcle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 306 (2000) ("The
fundamental question here, I think, is twofold: How skeptical of ordinary politics, how
distrustful, ought we to be when it comes to the protection of religious minorities? And how
vigorously ought we to want the judiciary to protect, against discrimination, religious
minorities and their religious practice? My answer to the first question: very skeptically. My
answer to the second: very vigorously.").
227. See Laycock, Syllabus of Errors, supra note 219, at 117-77. He uses the federal
courts as examples, however, and does not explain how this insulation would operate in
jurisdictions that elect their judges. See id. Recent state judicial elections show that decisions
with religious and cultural overtones can have serious repercussions for elected judges. For
example, three Iowa Supreme Court justices lost their retention elections after an aggressive
campaign against their support of a ruling striking down Iowa's ban on same-sex marriages.
Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REG. (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.
desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismiss-three-justices?nc
ick-check=1, archived at http://perma.cc/2X2W-SX4X.
228. Laycock, Syllabus of Errors,supra note 159, at 1175-77.
229. Compare HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 3 ("The purpose of this book is to
persuade Americans to take off the rose-colored glasses and to come to terms with the
necessity of making religious individuals and institutions accountable to the law so that they
do not harm others."), with Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty As Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314, 353 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty] ("Religious
liberty does not view religion as a good thing to be promoted, nor as a dangerous force to be
contained. But people who view religion in each of these ways struggle to capture the
Religion Clauses for their side.").
230. HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 8 (stating that exemptions should only be granted
when "immunizing religious conduct is consistent with public welfare, health, and safety").
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should be allowed to cause harm to the broader society. z3' Laycock
reaches a different conclusion.232

Protecting religious freedom is

important and necessary because (1) the Constitution says we should;
(2) religion is a deeply held, fundamental belief for many people; and

(3) without broad judicially crafted exemptions, religion can become a
33
divisive force in ordinary politics.
If all it takes to gain an exemption is to wrap religion around a
personal or political position, then everyone will be a "law unto

themselves. 234 Without some limiting principle to filter claims, 35 the
Free Exercise Clause will either swallow up the rest of the Constitution
or be emptied of content.236 Hamilton and Laycock demonstrate,

however, that discerning the correct principle will not be easy.

Id. at 304 ("[This] approach ... is consistent with the high ideal of republicanism -to yield
the greatest good possible for the people."). She is not alone in her skepticism. See, e.g.,
Gedicks, supra note 216, at 574 ("There no longer exists a plausible explanation of why
religious believers-and only believers-are constitutionally entitled to be excused from
complying with otherwise legitimate laws that burden practices motivated by moral belief.");
Sherry, supra note 206, at 495 ("[T]he government may not single out any irrational beliefs
for preferential treatment, nor is it required to treat alternative epistemologies as favorably as
Enlightenment rationality.... To do otherwise is for the government to accept as true the
claims of particular religious believers-a course of action that is dangerous to government
and religion alike ....
").
231. See HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 303 ("The rule of law is diminished when
individuals may use their personal beliefs to avoid the law and to harm others.").
232. See Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 229, at 319 ("[R]eligion is to be left as
wholly to private choice and private commitment as anything can be.").
233. Id. at 317.
234. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("'Laws,' we said, 'are made for
the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, they may with practices.... Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because
of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself."' (alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 16667 (1878))).
235. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 90, at 94 (arguing that there is no principled way to
distinguish religious exemptions from other claims of conscience); Angela C. Carmella,
Responsible Freedom Under The Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the
Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 409 (2007) (arguing that the question of exemptions
requires normative judgment about their contribution to the common good).
236. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 90, at 94-98 (arguing that an exemption regime either
would constitutionalize civil disobedience or would lead to unfair exclusions); Carmella, supra
note 235, at 409 (stating that an alternative to normative judgment would be to create
"absolute religious freedom or to impose only the state's legal norms").
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C. The Neutrality Problem
Third, the gun cases relate to what it means to be "neutral" as to
religion. Courts use neutrality as the talisman of religion clause
jurisprudence without explaining what being neutral really means.237
Douglas Laycock has argued that instead of a single concept called
"neutrality," there are three different ways that laws can be neutral as to
religion.238 He distinguishes between formal neutrality, substantive
neutrality, and disaggregated neutrality. 239 Formal neutrality requires
the government to use neutral categories.24 ° Substantive neutrality
requires the government to use neutral incentives. 2 1 Laycock uses the
example of a ban on children drinking alcohol. 242 The ban is formally
neutral because it does not use religion as a defining category.243 Like
the statutes in the opt-out jurisdictions, it applies to everyone regardless

237. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994); Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(laws must be neutral and generally applicable); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987); Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970); see also Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 56
(2007) [hereinafter Laycock, Substantive Neutrality] (stating that the Supreme Court has been
"notoriously inconsistent" with neutrality); R. George Wright, Can We Make Sense of
"Neutrality" in the Religion Clause Cases?: Seven Rescue Attempts and a Viable Alternative, 65
SMU L. REV. 877, 878-79 nn.1-2 (2012) (comprehensive listing of federal courts' use of
neutrality).
238. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999-1011 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Neutrality Toward

Religion]; see Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 52; see also Andrew
Koppelman, And I Don't Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American Law, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 1115 (2013) (arguing that neutrality is a master concept that operates in slightly
different ways in different contexts.). But see Chad Flanders, Can We Please Stop Talking
About Neutrality? Koppelman Between Scalia and Rawls, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1139, 1147 (2013)
("We are better off, I think, giving up on neutrality as a term of art and simply arguing
directly in terms of religion's distinct value: we protect religion not because we are being
neutral, but because of the value of religion as such.").
239. Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 238, at 999-1011.
240. Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 54 ("Formal neutrality requires
neutral categories. A law is formally neutral if it does not use religion as a category-if
religious and secular examples of the same phenomenon are treated exactly the same.").
241. Id. at 54-55 ("Substantive neutrality requires neutral incentives. A law is
substantively neutral if it neither 'encourages [n]or discourages religious belief or disbelief,
practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance."' (alteration in original) (quoting
Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 238, at 1001)).
242. Id. at 55.
243. Id.
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of religious or secular status. 244 But it would be proper for states to
make exceptions for such practices (or, at least, look the other way):
[A]n exception that permits children to take communion wine is
substantively neutral. Exempting communion wine from the ban
on under-age consumption of alcohol is extraordinarily unlikely
to induce anyone to become a Christian, to join a denomination
that uses real wine in its communion service, or to attend
communion services more often - unless that person already
desired to do these things but had been deterred by the threat of
government-imposed penalties. Consuming communion wine is
a desirable activity only to those who already believe in the
religious teaching that gives meaning to the act. Forbidding
children to take communion wine, or criminally punishing their
parents and the priest who gives them the sacrament,powerfully
discourages an act of worship. But exemption does not
encourage any child to take communion, or any parent to take
his child to a communion service, who is not already religiously
motivated do so. An exemption does not change anyone's
religious incentives;
criminalization changes those incentives
245
profoundly.
Categorical jurisdictions explicitly use religion to set houses of
worship apart from most private property owners.246 Apparently,
houses of worship are thought to be like other public or government
buildings. If so, then these laws are formally neutral because "religious
and secular examples of the same phenomenon" are treated alike.247 On
the surface, that appears true. On closer inspection, however, this
exclusion seems to flow from assumptions about the naturalness or
reasonableness of religious claims. 48
At the same time, opt-out jurisdictions are substantively neutral
because they allow property owners, including houses of worship, to
exclude guns from their property upon compliance with the statutory

244. See Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 55 ("[F]orbidding children
to take communion wine is formally neutral. Children cannot consume alcoholic beverages in
any amount for any purpose. Religion is not a category in the formulation or application of
this rule; alcohol is forbidden to children whether for religious purposes or secular
purposes."); supranote 14.
245. Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 55 (emphasis added).
246. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b) (2011 & Supp. 2013).
247. See Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supranote 237, at 54.
248. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
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requirements.249 Here the law is formally neutral on its face but
substantively neutral in its application. Under this categorization,
however, the cases should have been analyzed in a different way. The
substantively neutral restrictions of Minnesota's opt-out law was found
to burden religion and was subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis because
it seemed that the religious claim was more reasonable.5 0 Georgia's
categorical ban lacked formal neutrality (and for that matter,
substantive neutrality as well) but was not found to even burden
religion. 1
In Laycock's terms, the categorical 'ban served to
practice... [or] observance.' 2
religious..,
"discourage[]
Perhaps searching for neutrality is a fool's errand. As Steven Smith
noted,
[T]he quest for neutrality, despite its understandable appeal and
the tenacity with which it has been pursued, is an attempt to
grasp at an illusion. Upon reflection, this failure should not be
surprising. The impossibility of a truly "neutral" theory of
religious freedom is analogous to the impossibility, recognized by
modern philosophers, of finding some outside Archimedean
point ...from which to look down on and describe reality.
Descriptions of reality are always undertaken from a point
within reality. In the same way, theories of religious freedom are
always offered from the viewpoint of one of the competing
positions that generate the need for such a theory; there is no
neutral vantage point that can permit the theorist or judge to
transcend these competing positions. 3
The gun cases show how difficult it is to find a "neutral" vantage
point from which to view religion cases. The result is that courts will
avoid the actual right at issue and rely on background assumptions
about religion and neutrality. 4 Perhaps the very nature of religious
249. See supra note 14.
250. See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. Minnesota, 745 N.W.2d 194,203-211 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2008).
251. See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d, 1244, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2012).
The court seemed to conflate the burden question with the question about the neutrality of
the law.
252. Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 238, at 1001, quoted in Laycock,
Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 54-55.
253. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 96-97 (1995).
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254. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text; see also Frank S. Ravitch, Rights
and the Religion Clauses, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 91 (2008) (arguing that the
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claims makes them difficult, if not impossible, to translate into legal
categories. 255 They are either impossible to understand by a "rational"
and "objective" analysis or sanitized, tamed, or corrupted.2 5 6 Moreover,
particularistic religious claims for exemptions do not co-exist well in an
increasingly diverse and non-religious country.257 Finding a neutral
vantage point in such difficult terrain seems unlikely.25 8
VIII.

CONCLUSION: WHAT'S FREE EXERCISE FOR?

These three issues share a common core: what is the purpose of the
Free Exercise Clause, what functions does it serve, historically and
today, and what should it protect. Modern law focuses on protecting the
autonomy of the individual believer.2 9 The Free Exercise Clause,
perhaps like the Free Speech Clause, allows the individual to forge a
personal identity free from government compulsion. 26
Under this
Supreme Court's shift to formal neutrality has shifted religion clause doctrine from protecting
minority religions to preserving majority religions' political and social dominance). But see
Sisk, supra note 205, at 1036 (stating that majority religion claimants have no advantage in
religion clause cases).
255. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994
U. ILL. L. REV. 535, 540 [hereinafter Greene, Is Religion Special?] ("[R]eligion selfconsciously revels in the unsensible, whereas science and other sources from which people
make arguments at least purport to rely solely on the observable, on what we share as
humans.").
256. See supranotes 206-09 and accompanying text.
257. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE

SURVEY 1 (2008), availableat http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-st
udy-full.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UY8Z-NEJ5.
258. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Interpretingthe Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty,
Equality, and Free Speech Values -A Critical Analysis of "Neutrality Theory" and Charitable
Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 243, 247 (1999) (maintaining that
neutrality theory is not neutral); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489,
493 (2004) ("Claims of neutrality cannot be proven. There is no independent neutral truth or
baseline to which they can be tethered."); Wright, supra note 237, at 905 (concluding that
claims of neutrality are "incoherent" and there is no way to "reinterpret, rehabilitate, or
otherwise rescue the idea of neutrality in the Religion Clause context").
259. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 214, at 93 ("The Free Exercise Clause is supported by
seven values: (1) it protects liberty and autonomy; (2) it avoids the cruelty of forcing an
individual to do what he or she is conscientiously obliged not to do or to penalize an
individual for responding to an obligation of conscience; (3) it preserves respect for law and
minimizes violence triggered by religious conflict; (4) it combats religious discrimination; (5) it
protects associational values; (6) it promotes political community; and (7) it protects the
personal and social importance of religion." (footnotes omitted)).
260. Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 504, 548
(2003); William P. Marshall, Religion As Ideas: Religion As Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
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reading, it is agnostic (pun intended) as to the value of religion. Indeed,
it extends to non-religion the protections of the "religion" clauses. 2 1 On
the other hand, some scholars argue that the modern focus on autonomy
is misplaced. 6 2 The focus on autonomy, along with its attendant secular
virtues, ignores the real motivation for religious belief and practice.
Ultimately,

current justifications

of religious freedom

fail

because they do not take religion seriously on its own terms. No
Muslim believes that he should make a pilgrimage to Mecca to
raise the general level of civic virtue. He does it because his faith
that there is no God but Allah and that Mohammed is his

Prophet teaches that only by completing the hadj can he qualify
for entry into paradise. Likewise, Orthodox Jews are not
interested in creating mediating institutions but in faithfully
fulfilling the conditions of the covenant God made with Moses
and Israel on Mount Sinai. Buddhist temples are not factories for
the production of social capital but places where people attempt
to follow the example of Buddha to nirvana. Christian churches

are not components of some philosophy of the "secular public
realm" but meetings of "fellow citizens with the saints, and of the
household of God" seeking salvation through Jesus Christ the
Son of God. In short, the current arguments generally offered in

favor of religious liberty have nothing to do with the ultimate
concerns that are at the heart of religious
belief. They simply do
63
not take such concerns seriously.

ISSUES 385, 406 (1996) (concluding that religion is a set of ideas and constitutive of personal
identity); David B. Salmons, Toward a Fuller Understanding of Religious Exercise:
Recognizing the Identity-Generativeand Expressive Nature of Religious Devotion, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1243, 1258 (1995); Greene, Is Religion Special?, supra note 256, at 536-37. But see
McClain, supranote 178.
261. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (holding that purely ethical or
moral beliefs that impose a duty of conscience qualify for religious exemption for military
draft); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) (holding that "sincere and
meaningful" belief that holds same place as conventional religious belief satisfies statutory
requirement for conscientious objector status).
262. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275, 280 (1996) (stating that autonomy cannot explain complexity
of religious liberty law); David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious
Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (1991) (arguing that volitional assumptions limit proper
reach of the Free Exercise Clause).
263. Note, Wagering on Religious Liberty, 116 HARV. L. REV. 946, 950-51 (2003)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Ephesians 2:19 (King James)).
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Under this reading, the Framers were not agnostic (in either sense)
about the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause. They wanted to protect
religion." As Michael Stokes Paulsen puts it:
The Free Exercise Clause only makes sense on the assumption
that God exists; that God makes claims on the loyalty of human
beings; and that these claims are prior to and superior in
obligation to the claims of the State. The Clause thus embodies
an essentially religious premise.265
The Framers intended to create legal equality among all religions
and protect those actions that flowed from a religious premise. 66 To do
otherwise renders the religion clauses incoherent because it ends up
protecting purely secular behavior:
If the Free Exercise Clause ... confer[s] a sphere of immunity

from facially neutral government regulation, then the "exercise"
of atheism, agnosticism, skepticism, rationalism, humanism, and
secularism indeed confers a huge area of exemption from
government laws. And it is a zone of exemption having, really,
nothing much to do with religion. It is secular freedomautonomy in general- treated as on par with religion, because it
is religion's complement, secular analog, or even opposite.26 7

Members of each camp sometimes reach the same conclusion about
how strong the Free Exercise Clause should be.2" Michael Stokes
Paulsen puts the case thusly:
[W]e protect religious liberty because religion is important-or,
as I would refine it, because God exists and His claims are of
264. McConnell, Why Protect,supra note 211, at 777-81 (the Framers intended religious
exemptions). But see Hamburger, supra note 216, at 932 (stating that there is little evidence
the Framers intended broad religious exemptions).
265. Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good: Making Sense of Religious
Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1997) [hereinafter Paulsen, God Is Great].
266. McConnell, Why Protect,supra note 211, at 777-81, 808.
267. Paulsen, God Is Great,supra note 265, at 1603.
268. Compare Paulsen, God Is Great,supra note 265, at 1610 ("Accordingly, the Free
Exercise Clause confers an area of substantive immunity from government regulation that
interferes with religious belief and exercise. We prefer the sincere individual's claim of
religious conscience to the government's claim of secular authority, absent an extraordinary
showing of insincere religion or of a threat to state interests of the highest order."), with
Laycock, Religious Exemptions, supra note 69, at 176 ("Regulatory exemptions are an
essential part of meaningful religious liberty. The right to believe a religion is hollow without
the right to practice the religion; it leaves committed believers subject to persecution for
exercising their religion.").

2015]

GOD AND GUNS

prior and greater obligation than those of the state - we should
protect only those religions whose beliefs and commands we
understand to fall within the acceptable range of having a
plausible claim to be True Beliefs. In fact, however, we protect
much more, including a considerable amount of what even
religious people view as religious rubbish. We do so because we
do not trust political majorities, and we certainly do not trust
government agents, to distinguish Truth from Rubbish and
because it is exceedingly difficult (and dangerous) to try to draft
a religious freedom rule that successfully draws such a line. In
short, we protect the core freedom because we believe it consists
of something objectively important and true, and we adopt an
overbroad prophylactic rule for the sake of protecting the core
freedom. At least, that was
probably the original purpose of
2 69
protecting religious freedom.
These conceptual issues merge in weapons cases. Courts must
decide whether or not a substantial burden on religion exists. To get
there, they must resolve the background questions of the Free Exercise
27 That
Clause's purpose and what should count as a "religious burden.""
they do so silently and unwittingly speaks volumes about the
incoherency of contemporary free exercise law.

269. Paulsen, God Is Great,supra note 265, at 1606.
270. This dilemma repeated itself in the litigation over the Affordable Care Act.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that a mandate in the
Affordable Care Act requiring private businesses to provide insurance coverage for
contraception violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Acts because it forced them to
facilitate activities that violated their religious beliefs without sufficient justification). Like
the Georgia and Minnesota plaintiffs, the plaintiffs argued that simply complying with the law
was a significant burden that could not be justified by any compelling government interest.
Id. at 2764-67, 2780 (arguing that complying with law's minimum insurance requirements
burdened plaintiff's religious beliefs). Resolving these cases in favor of the plaintiffs, the
Court had to first accept-on faith, as it were-that religious beliefs and not personal
preferences undergirded these claims. See id. at 2778-79; see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1141 (10th Cir. 2013) ("[W]hen the plaintiff drew a moral line
between foundry and factory work, it was not the Court's prerogative to determine whether
the line he drew 'was an unreasonable one."' (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,
715 (1981)). The religious nature of these claims may seem self-evident, but that is precisely
the way that "natural" religious claims are always privileged. Their claims are no more selfevident than either the Edina Lutherans or Georgia Baptists claims were.
See
GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012); Edina Cmty. Lutheran
Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 203-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). Imagine another set of
plaintiffs claiming a religious obligation to provide contraception. It is hard to picture courts
so easily finding a burden in those cases. Like the GeorgiaCarry.orgplaintiffs, their claims
would not seem "natural."
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These seemingly minor cases reveal how muddy and opaque free
exercise law is.271 Courts decide cases without a clear conceptual or
historical framework. They silently measure the claim by the degree to
which the claim seems compatible with their own experience, thus
making free exercise law a reflection of their conceptions, fears, and
assumptions about religion. It is, as it were, that courts only "see
through a glass, darkly. ' '272 We await the day when they can see directly.

271. Alan Brownstein, Why Conservatives, and Others, Have Trouble Supporting the
Meaningful Enforcement of Free Exercise Rights, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 925 (2010)
(American free exercise jurisprudence is "shallow").
272. 1 Corinthians 13:12 (King James). Paul described how difficult it is for human
beings to comprehend things that could not be directly grasped by our current experience
which the King James version poetically and beautifully translated as "through a glass,
darkly." Id. This notion is expressed more directly in some modern translations. See, e.g., 1
Corinthians 13:12 (New Living) ("Now we see things imperfectly as in a poor mirror.").
Other translations are available at Compare Translations for 1 Corinthians 13:12, BIBLE
STUDY TOOLS (last visited Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.biblestudytools.com/1-corinthians/1312-compare.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/AH4V-236R.

